执行国际仲裁裁决 “既判争点禁反言”（Issue Estoppel）的应用与争议（第一部分）

2017年第08期    作者:李霭明    阅读 9,937 次

简言

1.随着中国经济的持续发展，内地企业趋于国际化。而海外企业进驻内地的例子亦如恒河沙数。当中因各种原因而产生的贸易纠纷变得普遍。可是，把事件诉诸法庭往往有可能对合作关系造成进一步的影响，对企业形象难免有一定程度的损害。基于仲裁的保密特质，其渐渐成为被企业接受的解决贸易纷争的一个常用方法。

2.当仲裁中的一方成功获得裁决，接着一定是希望能尽快取得裁决所衍生的实质成果。但由于败方的有价值资产可能遍布世界各地，仲裁裁决的执行往往变成一件不直截了当的事情。

3.中国是《承认及执行外国仲裁裁决公约》（1958年，纽约）(下称为「《纽约公约》」) 的签订国。 《纽约公约》中的第五条规定，在一个成员国领土内作出的仲裁裁决，另一成员国法院只能运用酌情权以有限的理由，包括第五条所列举的，拒绝承认或执行该仲裁裁决。

4.然而，随着法理的发展，各地国家法院因各种原因而拒绝执行仲裁裁决已变得不罕见。其中，因英国备受争议的案例 Diag Human SE v Czech Republic [2014] EWHC 1639 (Comm) 于 2014 年的出现 (案例的详细说明请见本文的第二部份)，国际仲裁亦更关注以普通法「既判争点禁反言」为依据抵抗裁决执行的情况。本文旨在对此既重要且务实的问题作深入探讨，并以不同普通法国家的案例为例子作进一步说明讨论。

“既判争点禁反言”原则

5.“既判争点禁反言”是一个已被确立及被英国法院采纳已久的普通法原则。其意指如达到以下列举的条件，与讼双方均不能在往后任何诉讼中再争议同一个已被早前法院审理的议题：

(1)        先前的判决必须由具有管辖权的法院提出;

(2)        先前的判决必须是最终和具决定性的 (final and conclusive) 及基于案情审订 (on the merits) 的;

(3)        诉讼各方必须相同;

(4)        议题必须相同，即先前法院决定的问题必须与后来诉讼中需审理的问题相同。

(见 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (no 2) [1967] 1 AC 853)

“既判争点禁反言”在仲裁裁决执行诉讼 (Enforcement Proceedings) 中的应用

英国

6.一般而言，英国法院认为仲裁地法院 (Courts at the seat of arbitration) 对仲裁裁决的执行性或有效性所作出的判决在往后的执行诉讼中有排他性作用。如在 Gater Assets Ltd v NAK Naftogaz Ukrainiy [2008] EWHC 237 (Comm) 的第三段中法庭指出:

 

“… Mr Higham QC for the Defendant did formally keep open an argument to the effect that relief was available under section 103(2)(d) on the basis that the arbitration tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the dispute.  However this point has already twice been decided against the Defendant by the competent Russian supervisory courts.  There can be no prospect of the Defendant escaping the preclusive effect of such determinations unless it succeeds in its argument rooted in public policy and moreover in a manner relevant to the finding that the arbitration tribunal enjoyed jurisdiction.”

7.可是，英国法院会如何看待仲裁地以外法院的执行判决于当地的影响力则还未被厘清确定。但从案例的发展可见，在关于仲裁裁决的执行诉讼中，英国法院愿意考虑甚至接受以「既判争点禁反言」为基础提出的论据。而 Good Challenger Navegante SA v Metalexportimport SA [2003] EWCA Civ 1668 是一个较早期出现的关于以「既判争点禁反言」为论点尝试说服英国法庭接纳仲裁地以外法院对仲裁裁决执行作的判决的具代表性的案例。

8.在1983年，Good Challenger 公司在一个伦敦仲裁中获得了针对 Metalimportexport 公司的裁决。

9.在1992年，Good Challenger 公司于罗马尼亚寻求仲裁裁决的执行及认可并获得 布加勒斯特市法院允许。 Metalimportexport 公司申请上诉，上诉庭虽维持裁决认可的判决，但却以裁决的执行在英国法律下已过时限为由推翻执行。此时限问题被争议至罗马尼亚最高法院。最终该最高法院于 1998 年裁定维持上诉庭判决。

10.与此同时，在 1993年，Good Challenger公司于英国寻求裁决的执行并获 Saville 法官批出执行许可（leave to enforce）。可是，Good Challenger公司并没有在最新的英国民事程序规则生效前把Saville法官的执行准许命令派送给Metalimportexport公司，因此该命令在当时英国法律下被自动暂停有效 (automatically stayed)。 2001 年，英国法院解除对该命令的暂停。

11.2003 年，英国法院再次对 Good Challenger 公司获得的仲裁裁决批出执行许可 。本案正是处理此 2003 年判决的上诉聆讯。上诉的争议在于罗马尼亚最高法院指裁决的执行在英国法律下已过时限的判决是否构成「既判争点禁反言」以使Good Challenger 公司不能就同一议题在英国法庭作争议因此仲裁裁决不能在英国被执行。

12.本案不争议的是时限问题关系于罗马尼亚法律第 105/1992 号第 174(a) 及 (b) 条有关执行外国判决 (即相关的仲裁裁决) 的条文的运用。英国上诉庭认为就某一外国判决能否于罗马尼亚执行，第 174(a) 条涉及对相关英国法律的考虑 (即相关的外国法律)，而第174(b) 条则关于对罗马尼亚当地法律的考虑。虽然如此，英国上诉庭认为罗马尼亚最高法院是不须分别就第 174(a) 及 (b) 条作出判决才能得出相关仲裁裁决能否在罗马尼亚被执行的结论，只要裁定第 174(a) 或 (b) 条其中一条的结论是不被执行便已足够达至本案的判决结果。见第六十四段之原文:

 

“…this case is somewhat different from that described by Coleridge J because, in order to conclude that the award was not enforceable in Romania, the Supreme Court did not have to decide both the issue of Romanian law under Article 174(b) and the issue of English law under Article 174(a).  A decision on either limb would have sufficed.  It would only have had to decide both points in order to hold that the award was enforceable in Romania.  That can be seen by the decisions of the Municipal Court and of the Court of Appeal, each of which decided only the Romanian law point under Article 174(b).”

 

13.本案例接纳“既判争点禁反言”原则在英国的仲裁裁决执行诉讼中本质上是能够适用的。但经仔细研究罗马尼亚最高法院的判词后，英国上诉庭认为罗马尼亚最高法院就时限问题的判决只是就罗马尼亚第 174(b) 条关于罗马尼亚法律的运用作出的。就第 174(a) 条关于相关的英国法律，判词中只有一段有限的讨论，这明显不构成该判决的主要依据，对判决而言只属附属及附带意见性质(merely collateral or obiter) 。因此，关于第 174(a) 条的决定就整个判决来说是非必要的亦不具决定性的。因此，英国上诉庭作为仲裁地法院裁定“既判争点禁反言”不能于此案被成立。当中法官在判词中有以下的说法:

 

“84. It seems to me that on a fair reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court the primary basis for its decision was the view which it formed under Article 174(b) that the claim was time barred under Romanian law.  That was sufficient to decide the case in favour of the charterers and, in particular, to dismiss the appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal, which had decided the matter solely on the Romanian law point. 

85. By contrast, the judgment contains no reasons why the court rejected the owners’ submission that the six year period had been extended by the part payments and the acknowledgments.  It is of course possible that the court rejected the evidence relied upon by the owners as inadmissible but, if it did, it did not say so.  It might be said that the court rejected the part payments on the basis that the dates of the payments “were not even proved to be related to the amounts” of the award, but no such submission could be made with regard to the alleged acknowledgment in the telex of 17 March 1988, which, as stated in paragraph 18 above, would have been sufficient to extend the period to a date after 27 May 1992.  The reader of the judgment is left to speculate as to the reasons which led the court to reach the conclusion it did.

86. I agree with the judge that that is a pointer to the conclusion that this was a secondary or collateral or obiter reason for the decision.  In any event, it is far from clear whether the court was treating the Article 174(a) point as an equal ground for its decision to dismiss the appeal and, given the caution which the cases show should be used in deciding questions of this kind, for my part I would not hold that the charterers have shown that the determination of the Article 174(a) point was central to the decision and not collateral to it.

…

89. In these circumstances, it is not necessary to consider whether, if the other ingredients of issue estoppel were present it would be appropriate to hold that there are here special circumstances which would make it unjust to hold the owners to be issue estopped from arguing that the claim was not time barred in January 1993.  It appears to me that the lack of clarity as to the role played by the Article 174(a) point in the reasoning and decision of the Supreme Court leads to the conclusion that it would be unjust to the owners to hold that its decision gives rise to an issue estoppel.  It does not, however, do so by the application of what might be called the special circumstances exception but as a result of the conclusion that the charterers have not demonstrated that the determination of the Article 174(a) point was necessary to the decision as opposed to collateral to it.”

 

14.  从以上较早期的案例可见，在裁定「既判争点禁反言」是否适用以接纳仲裁地以外法院对仲裁裁决执行的判决，英国法庭会对外国法院就有关执行仲裁裁决议题上的讨论作十分深入地分析。可见英国法庭对以此原则推反仲裁裁决于英国的执行持相对审慎的态度。

 

李霭明

香港执业大律师, 获香港中文大学法学颁授法律学位（JD）及英国剑桥大学法学硕士。

业务方向：商业及公司法，土地法，遗产法及公法等，亦为国际仲裁中各方作代表律师。